The Right To Assign Interest In A Note To Any Financial Institution

This appeal requires us to address federal subject matter jurisdiction under 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2). Following the removal of their class action lawsuit to federal district court by Cross-defendants-appellees Federal Deposit InsuranceCorporation-Corporate (“FDIC-Corporate”) and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation-Receiver (“FDIC-Receiver”), Plaintiffs-appellants William and Gladdean Castleberry (“Castleberrys”) moved to remand the case back to Alabamastate court. The district court denied the Castleberrys’s motion to remand and ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants-appellees Goldome Credit Corporation (“Goldome”) and Daiwa Finance Corporation.Daiwa Finance Corporation is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Daiwa America 1 Corporation (“DAC”). Daiwa Mortgage Acceptance Corporation and Daiwa Securities America are also wholly-owned subsidiaries of DAC.  DAC and its three subsidiaries are Defendants appellees in this action and will be collectively referred to as “Daiwa” in this opinion. The contract between Masterbuilt and the Castleberrys provided that Masterbuilt 2 reserved the right to assign its interest in the Castleberrys’s note to any “financial institution.”  Moreover, it noted that if the Castleberrys’s contract was assigned to Goldome, “Goldome will become an assignee.”  The contract also listed Goldome’s.In making this determination, we decline to address the Castleberrys’s other timeliness 10 arguments which relate to their claim that FDIC-Corporate should not be allowed to exercise a separate removal right from FDIC-Receiver. In essence, the Castleberrys argue that FDIC-Receiver had an opportunity to remove the case after it was filed and that, by not removing at that time, FDIC-Receiver waived the ability of any FDIC entity to remove the action because there is only one removal right given to the FDIC.Conclusion:As we have explained, the terms of 12 U.S.C. § 1819 evince a clear congressional intent to provide a federal forum when the FDIC is made a party to state court litigation. See Lazuka, 931 F.2d at 1535. Based on a straightforwardapplication of § 1819 to the facts of this case, we conclude that Daiwa’s assertion of a cross-claim against FDIC-Corporate and FDIC-Receiver triggered § 1819 removal rights, which were timely exercised by the FDIC entities. Accordingly, contrary to the Castleberrys’s contentions, the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over their claims on removal. Moreover, based on our review of the district court’s application of Alabama law to the Castleberrys’s claims, summary judgment was properly granted in favor of Goldome and Daiwa. Accordingly, the district court’s disposition of the Castleberrys’s claims is AFFIRMED.